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BONAVENTURE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY DEBATE ON 
APOPHATIC THEOLOGY 
Adriaan T. Peperzak 
To what extent does Bonaventure's work contribute to a renewal of negative 
theology? Rather than answering this question directly, this article focuses on 
the negative moments which, according to Bonaventure, characterize the 
human quest for God and the docta ignorantia to which it is oriented. 
Bonaventure's synthesis of Aristotelian ontology and Dionysian Neoplatonism 
is a wisdom that admires God's being good as manifested in Christ's human 
suffering and death. 
God has died, at least in science and philosophy. He is agonizing in reli-
gious study, perhaps even in some divinity schools. Atheism and a careful 
sequestration of God from current business are the two main forms in 
which Academia deals with the long history of religion, which, notwith-
standing academic reservations, goes on. For scholarship faith, God and 
religion have become curiosa. The theoretical intention has separated itself 
from religious commitments; it abhors edifying language and has forgotten 
or rejected the long history of its association with contemplation. Curiositas 
is the word Bonaventure would use to characterize the study of religion 
that ensues from such a situation. But what is the relevance of such curios-
ity? Does at least philosophy accept that the question of the ultimate and 
its inevitable connections with science, education, ethos, politics, art, litera-
ture, and philosophy itself cannot be ignored in a discipline that is proud 
of its reflexive and universalizing capacities? Where the question of the 
ultimate (the ultimate concern, the ultimate meaning) is still alive, the cli-
mate is dramatic: after God's death nihilism seems inevitable, but how can 
human beings live without rejecting it? Not everybody appreciates 
Nietzsche's dramatic accents; the majority of scholars in philosophy seem 
quite satisfied with their way of life, but those who have seen the depths 
and felt the radicality of great traditions of thought from Parmenides to 
Hegel and from Amos and Isaiah to St. John of the Cross and Pascal, can-
not be impressed by the boring mediocrities of philosophers that ignore the 
life and death of God. 
Fortunately, there are still philosophers who are not afraid of making 
explicit the inevitable and necessary connections between their faith and 
thought. Some of them agree with Nietzsche, but they point out that his 
"God" is different from the God of Abraham, Isaac and Moses, and from 
the Father of Jesus Christ. Was Nietzsche the messenger of the death of a 
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Victorian God, the God of Kant, or the God of the slaves' resentment only? 
Similar questions should be asked with regard to pre- or non-Nietzschean 
atheists: some exponents of the Enlightenment, certain 19th and 20th cen-
tury scientists, and those contemporary philosophers who deny even the 
relevance of God. How do they understand the word "God"? What exact-
ly do they deny when they declare God non-existent? What is the mean-
ing, the possible or impossible relevance of "God"? 
According to certain philosophers and theologians, only "the God of 
metaphysics" has died, not the God of Abraham, Moses and Jesus. Others 
do not accept that the history of philosophical theology can be summarized 
in the word "metaphysics," if this signifies the onto-theo-logical mode of 
thinking with which Heidegger identified it; they want to free and retrieve 
the non-metaphysical insights of that history to show that there are better 
modes than the metaphysical one to approach God in theory. Still others 
think that the Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian use of "metaphysics" is 
a caricature of what metaphysics was in the high times of its history; they 
want to show that the works of pre-modern Christian thinkers contain 
important elements for a post-modem theory of our relations to God and of 
the names through which we can approach and somehow reach Him or Her. 
In the context of these attempts at naming God in our secularized world, 
apophatic theology plays an important role because it permits us to criti-
cize the deficiency of all the names and concepts that are used in talking 
about God, thus showing the essential limitations of our understanding, 
but at the same time permitting us to point - and in a sense to pass -
beyond the borders of our knowledge. Negative expressions are more true 
than affirmations about God, because they indicate more clearly that God 
surpasses any intellectual grasp. The darkness into which one ascends 
through contemplation is more appropriate than clarity because the infi-
nite splendor of the superessential Good can only blind finite intellects if 
they are not protected by a cloud of unknowing. 
There might be a certain similarity between the gesture of those who 
killed "God" or announced His death and those who retrieve the work of 
Pseudo-Dionysius and other masters of apophatism. If the murdered God 
is "human, all too human," a denial of such an all too human being is nec-
essary, but this denial does not solve the question of whether our existence 
in the world can be conceived of without essential connections to the living 
God who surpasses all names. 
It would be unworthy of a (theological or philosophical) theologian to 
always want to agree with non- or anti-Christian heroes of thought, but 
many motivations of those who reject "God" can be shared by Christians, 
and this strengthens the suspicion that the god they hate must indeed be 
denied or at least surpassed by something better: the unique God, who in all 
respects, or simpliciter, can be called Good. But is even "good" a perfectly 
appropriate predicate or name? Again, we must correct the finiteness of our 
concept ("good") by denying that "God is good" is a fully true expression. 
Going beyond all affirmations concerning God through negation does 
not mean that we forget, leave behind, erase or cross out the negated affir-
mations. Although "good" and "not-good" seem to contradict each other, 
both must be maintained: "good" must be kept together with "non-good" 
BONAVENTURE AND APOPHATIC THEOLOGY 183 
in a subordination that can be understood neither as species of a genus, nor 
as part of a whole. The negation does not fall back behind the affirmation, 
as if it tried to re-establish the indeterminacy that precedes all determina-
tions; it urges the thinker to think beyond that which we know as "good": 
some determination that, although its contours escape us, surpasses it and 
therefore demands us to express its non-coincidence with any good. God 
cannot be identified as good, but he is beyond-good (hyper-agathos). 
Dionysius even calls him super-divine, "hypertheos."l 
The tension created by the simultaneity of affirmations and negations is 
expressed in the return of the affirmations on a higher level, indicated by 
the word "hyper." The transition from the level of the affirmative predi-
cates to the level beyond, a transition urged by negation, would not be pos-
sible if affirmations and negations did not translate an orientation and a 
dynamism that urge and move the thinker who is looking for appropriate 
names. Only if thinking itself is already an oriented movement can the 
negation of its affirmations force it to go further, to pass over to a stage that 
is closer to the Orient. Theologia could not make any progress if it were not 
driven by an originary movement. The source of this movement can be 
called Desire. 
When thinking about Cod originates in desire, the investigation is an 
ascent that does not let itself be stopped by the denials of its affirmative 
experiments. It rather understands these negations as a warning not to 
take any affirmative result as definitive; all results are only pointers to a 
higher level of approaching God. The desire of Cod precedes and antici-
pates the end of thinking. What the thinker in the end must learn - and 
this is the most painful and humiliating for someone who has put his heart 
into theoria - is that theory does not reach far enough. The highest stage of 
thought is the obscurity of a well-prepared, thoughtfully entered igno-
rance: the learned agnosia of a union that cannot be expressed in language, 
a silent union in dark transcendence. 
Bonaventure and apophatic theology 
Can a study of Bonaventure's work enrich the actual discussion of negative 
theology? A certain expectation in this respect seems justified. Jacques 
Guy BougeroP called Bonaventure "without a doubt the most Dionysian 
mind of the Middle Ages" and although Bonaventure did not write exten-
sive commentaries on any of Dionysius' works, he quoted them at least 248 
times, as Bougerol has shown. Dionysius' influence on Bonaventure was 
relativized by Marianne Schlosser in her book Cogrzitio et Amor, and 
Bougerol himself recognizes that Bonaventure at times thinks very differ-
ently, and, in any case, "entirely transforms Dionysius' system."4 
However, transformation does not erase influence and is normal between 
great thinkers. For our question, the attempt of finding out to what extent 
Bonaventure retrieved Dionysius' apophatism must be made. However, 
this paper will not offer the result of such an attempt; I rather will insist on 
a few aspects of negativity in Bonaventure's conception of contemplation 
which seem to me relevant for a correct evaluation of the possibilities con-
tained in apophatic theology. For a thorough investigation of 
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Bonaventure's reception of Dionysius' work, I refer to Bougerol's precious 
studies "Saint Bonaventure et Ie Pseudo-Denys l' Are6pagiste" and "Saint 
Bonaventure et la Hierarchie dionysienne."s The role of negative theology 
in Bonaventure - without emphasis on his relation to Dionysius - has been 
laid out in the excellent study "Lux Inaccessibilis. Zur negativen Theologie 
bei Bonaventura" of Marianne Schlosser." 
What I would like to offer is a sketch of the way in which Bonaventure 
points out how the human search for insight, if it is accomplished appro-
priately, terminates in the docta ignorantia of an obscure and silent, but very 
awake union with God. In doing this, I will draw heavily on 
Bonaventure's second conference on the Hexaemeron, but I will also use 
other works, such as the Commentary on the Sententiae and the Itinerary of 
the Mind to God. 
Desire for wisdom 
Continuing the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition, Bonaventure sees 
desire as constitutive for the nahne of human beings. We are driven and 
in movement by a desire that we have not chosen. It is important to realize 
that this drive and this movement determine all our activities, including 
our thinking, contemplating, and speculating. A philosophical or theolog-
ical vision is continually on the move from stage to stage, according to the 
quality of life of the thinker who unfolds such a vision. Thinking is not 
separable from the rest of a human life; the moral and religious - and we 
could add the aesthetical and psychological- level of a thinker conditions 
and codetermines what the thinking of this thinker projects and how it 
proceeds. Without an intense desire (concupiscentia, vehemens desiderium) of 
wisdom (sapientia), for example, we will never acquire true insight, not 
even discover the way that leads to it. Moral decency too, a pure heart, 
even holiness (sanctitas) are necessary conditions for being perceptive and 
receptive enough to discover the truth: the truth of a universe created, 
loved, saved, illuminated and inhabited by God, i.e., the truth of God as 
mirrored in the universe (Hex 2, 2-6). 
Contemporary phenomenology recognizes what all traditions of spiritu-
ality have known for millennia, namely that thinking needs specific affec-
tive and practical conditions in order to let things show and unfold, to do 
justice to humans and animals, and to be receptive to the manifestations of 
God's presence. Reason and intelligence must be oriented by a desire for 
genuiness and purity. This is the cathartic law of perception and thought, 
often forgotten, despised or suppressed under the domination of scientism 
in philosophy and religious studies. 
A corollary to this law is that the search for insight cannot be achieved 
as a project for which, in a first stage, we could lay the foundation in order 
to build other levels on it in later stages. Most often, the first stage will not 
represent a completely authentic and noble mode of life, and therefore will 
be deficient in perception, sensitivity and willingness to accept truths that 
are painful or humiliating. The movement of thought can thus not take for 
granted that its first stage is trustworthy enough to found a system. If the 
question of the conditions and their purification is taken seriously, a 
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thinker must start many times: each progress in honesty and sensitivity 
makes new fundamental insights possible. 
Someone who has perfectly realized humanity's radical desire, is wise: a 
saint is "deifarmis" and "wisdom [itself] enters immediately in him" (Hex 2, 
6). Yet, Bonaventure holds also that wisdom cannot be acquired without 
intellectual labor. The dialectical relation between insight (intellectus) and 
wisdom (sapientia) is one of the central problems of his oeuvre. He under-
lines that wisdom - as discovery of the ultimate understanding of existence 
- is a grace and given only to a pure heart; but analysis and reflection 
enrich a naIve reception of that gift. Intellectuals can become wise only if 
they are as pure as the "simple" saints; these do not miss anything essential 
for their glory, but they avoid the temptations of intellectual arrogance and 
vain curiosity. Theologians, however, have a chance to love God not only 
with their heart, but also with their whole intellect. 
Bonaventure distinguishes four "aspects" (aspectus) or "faces" (facies) of 
wisdom (Hex 2, 8-34): 
1. Its basis lies in a network of a priori principles which constitute 
human consciousness. These principles owe their universal certainty and 
immutability to the radical orderliness (ars aeterna) of God, which is the 
source of light without which no human action can be performed. This 
light inhabits and unites all humans; it can be discovered through a reflec-
tion on the conditions of knowledge and practice. Faith, however, recog-
nizes the presence of God's Word in it (Itin. 2, 9; d. 5, 1). 
2. Sacred Scripture mysteriously reveals the meaning of human exis-
tence to those who are humble enough to receive it as a grace and sensible 
enough to understand the symbols and signs through which the sacred 
mysteries are revealed. This revelation provokes faith, hope and love 
without abolishing the enigmatic character that belongs to a mortal life on 
earth. Human beings need allegorical, anagogical and tropological expla-
nations to show them what and how they must believe, expect and act. 
Faith unites the members of the ecclesiastical body with its head; the ana-
gogical unfolding of hope prepares the soul for a way of existence that is 
ruled by active and contemplative love. Faith, hope and love guide the soul 
on its ascent from existence in a closed universe to the enjoyment of an infi-
nite space between God and human souls. 
3. In light of the Scriptures, the universe becomes understandable: "the 
entire world is like one full mirror" in which God's own wisdom is mir-
rored. The "book of nature" (liber naturae) receives its explanation from the 
''book of Scripture" (liber scripturae), but intellectual labor is necessary for 
their interpretation. The key for the explication of Scripture and the entire 
universe is Jesus Christ, since he is the center of all things. Any attempt to 
understand the whole of reality must start from this center because all wis-
dom is concentrated in Him. As the uncreated, incarnated and inspired 
Word of the Father, Christ encompasses the whole creation and manifests 
how everything is an expression of God's living presence (d. Hex 1, 11-37). 
It is difficult to find passages in Bonaventure's work that speak of God's 
absence. The overwhelming presence of God's light and grace to which 
Bonaventure constantly refers corresponds to the affectionate openness 
which, according to his descriptions, characterizes a well-disposed subject. 
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However, God is always hidden, enigmatically present in the form of 
humiliation, rejection and suppression. The Word that precedes creation 
and rules the world through its inspiration, invites the seekers for truth to 
participate in the drama of a persecuted guide. I will come back to this 
aspect of wisdom toward the end of this paper. 
4. The ultimate secret of God's wisdom cannot be understood, but nei-
ther are we condemned to total silence about it. Bonaventure calls this 
aspect of true wisdom "extremely difficult" (dificillima, Hex 2, 28). It is "the 
depth of God" (profunda Dei) of which Saint Paul in the first letter to the 
Corinthians writes: "Among the perfect we speak about a wisdom that is 
not of this age [ .. .L a wisdom that is hidden in mystery (in mysterio abscon-
dita), which no eye has seen and no ear has heard; it has not emerged in 
any human heart; but God has revealed it to us through His Spirit. For the 
Spirit investigates all things, even the depths of God" (1 Cor 2, 6-10). This 
quote introduces a transition from Paul to Dionysius. Bonaventure must 
have experienced this highest moment of wisdom, since he writes: "this 
[namely the experience of the beloved beyond all substances and knowl-
edge] nobody knows who does not have an experience of it." Yet, he 
prefers to appeal to the authority of "the Apostle" himself, who "taught 
this wisdom to Dionysius and Timotheus and other perfect [Christians], 
while he hid it to others" (Hex 2, 28). 
The mysterious hiddenness of the highest wisdom, as indicated by Paul's 
expression "hidden in mystery" (in mysterio abscondita), is explained in a 
commentary on the first chapter of Dionysius' Mystical Theology. 
Bonaventure calls it the text with which Dionysius brought his work to com-
pletion (consummavit, Hex 2, 29). To prevent misunderstandings, he reminds 
the reader that Dionysius' text calIDot be understood and that the wisdom 
indicated in it cannot be discovered unless one has passed through all for-
mer stages of discovery. He quotes the second section of the Mystica 
Theologia where Dionysius addresses himself to Timotheus, whom 
Bonaventure apparently sees as Paul's pupil and companion. Since 
Bonaventure, in Hex 2, 29, cites only the first words of the text, which must 
have been familiar to his listeners, referring by an "etc." to the rest, I will give 
here a more complete text, as it is found in the Itinerarium cap. 7, n. 5. The 
text is also quoted in Hex 2, 32, again in an abridged form ending in "etc." 
Several details of the quote are different in the three versions, a fact that 
Bougerol explains through the use of different Latin translations; perhaps we 
could also see it as an indication that Bonaventure quotes from memory. 
Here is a translation of the Latin version used by Bonaventure in his 
Itinerarium: 
However you, my friend7, concerning the mystical visions, be steadfast on 
your way;81eave the senses and the intellectual activities behind, as well as 
sensible and invisible things and all being and non-being; then you will be 
brought back as much as possible and without knowledge to the unity of 
him who is above all essence [or beingness] and science [or knowledgel. 
Indeed, by an immeasurable and absolute excess of your pure mind you 
will transcend yourself and all things toward the superessential beam of 
divine darkness, leaving all things behind and free from everything. 
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In his commentary, Bonaventure emphasizes the necessity of becoming 
detached and free from all grasping and "apprehensive" activities: the 
secret of God surpasses all beings and knowledge, including sensibility, 
imagination, evaluation and all intellectual operations. The summit of the 
ascent to which desire drives human beings, is a union in love beyond all 
understanding and representation. "Nobody has an idea of this, who does 
not experience it." And Bonaventure concludes rather laconically: "This 
shows that beatitudo does not entirely lie in our intellectual possibilities" 
(Hex 2, 29). Thus, the tradition that started from Plato's Republic and was 
developed by the Neoplatonists was retrieved by Bonaventure as a theory 
about the character of God's secret and the nature of human perfection. 
The henosis, which, according to Dionysius, surpasses the ontological 
dimension where noein and einai coincide, reveals itself in a non-intellectual 
experience: the experience of love. 
Desire reaches further than reason. It cannot grasp, but it can receive as 
a grace, the desired and beloved, if it separates itself affectively from all 
beings insofar as these are not God. These beings include one's own self -
"if this were possible," Bonaventure adds. Apparently he wants here to 
mitigate somewhat Dionysius' phrase about transcending one's own self. 
He could also have said that the detachment from one's self should target 
this only insofar as it does not participate in God's life. 
Affectivity, in the form of caritas, transcends intellect and science; it 
reaches the infinite and experiences the depth of God and humans simulta-
neously. Beyond the dialectic of affirmations and negations, trust, hope, 
gratitude, peace, pure enjoyment, and authentic love establish the self in 
the secret of the ultimate. "The soul enters into its own intimacy and there-
by reaches its summit, for the most intimate and the highest are the same" 
(Hex 2, 31). This union, which is "affective only" (Hex 2, 30), is sought by 
all the empirical and conceptual experiments in philosophy and theology. 
Through a supra-intellectual intimacy, the Spirit reveals the truth - not to 
the brain, but to the heart. We might vary Pascal's dictum in stating that 
the heart has experiences that reason does not know. 
If the perfection of wisdom lies in an affective event beyond theory and 
discussion, the importance of the opposition between affirmative and neg-
ative propositions is relativized. Although Bonaventure, like Dionysius, 
Plotinus, and Plato, emphasizes that consummate wisdom presupposes a 
thorough preparation in which intellectual and moral elements play 
important roles, all of them point out that the fulfillment of desire toward 
which all human endeavors and cultures converge does not lie in knowl-
edge but in the simplicity of an ignorance (agnosia) that is experienced as 
trust, hope, love. Those who walk the path of theory are oriented by an 
experience that somehow already is present in their departure. The 
desired union with God, who is "greater," "more than" and different from 
all realities theoretical speculation can fathom, codetermines the search, 
even if the searchers are not aware of it. The Spirit is present in their 
moods, their courage and their enjoyment. Indifference or mere curiosity 
harms their attachment to the ultimate desideratum. What they must learn 
during the unfolding of their disciplines is detachment from all that is not 
188 Faith and Philosophy 
God, but this does not mean that they should despise or lose the enjoyable 
wealth of creation, for this is not opposed to God, as if God were another, 
higher or highest being. The turn to God is a turn to universal love and 
participation. "All that is not God" is a name for those elements - or rather, 
for those non-elements and privations - that do not contain God's creative 
presence. To love God, who is "all in all things,"'! is therefore the purest 
form of love for all beings in the world and in history, for these have their 
being not only "from him and through him," but also "in him." 
The negation through which pure attachment to God becomes possible is 
a total, not merely theoretical, abnegation; it is the affective and effective 
abstraction (aphairesis, remotio) of perfect poverty with regard to the totality 
of Godless realities. The ultimate relationship presupposes death, as is clear 
from the statement in the Song of Songs: "love is strong as death" (Cant. 8,6). 
But the mortification that is demanded by love opens the lover for an 
encounter with the infinity of the living God who lives in all creation. 
-//-
In his conferences on the Hexaemeron, Bonaventure's style is often polemi-
cal: he scolds those philosophers who prefer Aristotle's interpretation of 
the human universe over the theological tradition. Although he had often 
shown how well he knew and how much he appreciated "the 
Philosopher" when Aristotle did not contradict the Christian faith, 
Bonaventure could be very harsh in speaking of the idea that philosophy 
would be able to operate independently from the dimension of faith; for 
example, when he calls the philosophers magi Pharaonis who sell their bad 
food in the darkness of Egypt (Hex 2, 7) or talks about their preference for 
having sex with an ugly maid over marrying the king's daughter called 
Sapientia (Hex 2, 7). This polemic might explain why the conferences of 
Bonaventure's last years seldom celebrate the greatness of human reason, 
but rather insist on its limitations. To prevent an all too sentimental read-
ing of his texts, we can turn to less polemical works, such as his impressive 
Commentary on Lombard's Sententiae, the very detailed Questiones Disputatae, 
or the masterpiece which is his Summa: the Itinerary of the Mind to God. I 
will here concentrate on the last three chapters of the latter, in which 
Bonaventure offers a summary of his metaphysics, his theology and his 
epistemology of religious experience, including its mystical aspects. These 
disciplines are unified by an image: the image of a contemplative traveller 
who, after having successfully sojourned in the temple court (atrium) and 
the holy (sancta), has entered the holiest (sancta sanctorum), where the 
wings of two Cherubim overshadow the ark on which the "mercy-seat" is 
placed. These angels represent the two supreme degrees of speculative 
contemplation. They extend to the farthest boundaries of human under-
standing and can only be followed by a supra-intellectual stage of contem-
plation. 
The Wisdom of the Cross 
Chapter five of the Itinerarium focuses on the most fundamental condition 
of knowledge as such: the light of the eternal truth (aeterna veritas). It is thus 
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concerned with the first face of wisdom as indicated in Hex 2. A reflection 
on this a priori light shows the most fundamental reality under two names: 
"Being" (esse) and "Good" (bonum). The second name is more true, but 
being is included, not negated in goodness. Although Bonaventure men-
tions and quotes Dionysius several times in chapters 5-7, he does not follow 
his versions of Plato's "good beyond being." He accepts a certain subordi-
nation of being under goodness, but reconciles them as mutually inclusive. 
The name "Being" (esse) revealed God to Moses (Exodus 3, 14) and summa-
rizes the wisdom of Israel, while "Good" summarizes the New Testament 
(Mt 28, 19; Luc 18, 19). Damascenus represents the theological tradition that 
is oriented by the first name, while Dionysius developed a theology of 
superessential goodness. lO Bonaventure wants to honor both traditions and 
distributes them as complementary perspectives among the two cherubim. 
In a splendid compendium of his onto-theo-logy, Bonaventure shows 
that being (esse) as such, i.e., as pure, completely actual, eternal, simple, 
perfect and unique, can only be the divine beingness of God and that all its 
characteristics mutually imply one another. The blinding light of a thor-
ough ontology reveals God's uniqueness as expressed in Deuteronomium 
6,4: "Hear Israel, your God is the one, unique God." 
The other cherub, i.e., the other supreme mode of speculation (cap. 6), 
discovers that the goodness of God implies God's trinity. Quoting the 
Dionysian "bonum dicitur diffusivum sui",ll Bonaventure shows how the 
principle of all principles (principalissimum fundamentum), which is the 
good (bonum), can be contemplated through its most radical, llncreated 
emanations. By way of preparation, and differently from Dionysius, he 
first makes sure that there will be no opposition between God's being, 
through which we discover his absolute unicity, and God's goodness. His 
argument for their unbreakable unity is Anselmian.12 Good, as purely or 
perfectly good (optimum), is "that better than which nothing can be 
thought." Since it is clearly better to be than not to be, however, it is 
impossible to think that God is not (!tin. 6, 2). 
Bonaventure's "deduction" of God's trinitarian constitution is given as a 
concretization of the principle that the good is self-diffusive. If to be good 
is to give from oneself, the perfect Good cannot but totally communicate its 
entire being to another, who then is identical with and, as receiver who 
thereby exists, also different from the origin. Bonaventure gives here (in 
chapter six) only an incomplete sketch of the arguments that are unfolded 
in his Questiones disputatae de Trinitate. For our purpose, I would like to 
underline only that the concept of "good" that underlies Bonaventure's 
argument is a Christian transformation of the generosity that was charac-
teristic for the Neoplatonic One. Emanation is now understood as creative 
and compassionate agape: absolute donation of all that a person is to anoth-
er person; sharing, in the most extreme way, one's being (esse). The 
"deduction" is, thus, based on the infinitization of Christian agape. 
To discover God as One Divinity in three loving and beloved Persons is 
a possibility of human reason but we cannot "comprehend" what we 
"apprehend" through it.13 The greatest difficulty lies here in the combina-
tion of God's being One and God's being Three, i.e., in the understanding 
of how being and goodness are intertwined. God can be known with great 
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certainty, but we cannot acquire an insight into God's tri-une constitution. 
Knowledge and incomprehensibility are here one: we can know how un-
understandable God is. However, this ignorant "knowledge" is not devel-
oped through apophatic discourse about its darkness; it is enacted in a 
transition from understanding to another, deeper and higher dimension of 
the human search: un-understanding speculation turns into admiration. 
Wonderment not only precedes philosophy, it also crowns its endeavors 
by introducing the investigating mind to an affective relationship with 
God (!tin. 6,3). 
This level of admiration is not the end of the spiritual journey, however; 
not even the end of its theoretical part. The ascent from the lowest level of 
creation to the sublime heights of the Creator's inner life, must be followed 
by a descent that confirms our belonging to the corporeal, earthly, corrupt-
ible and historical reality in which we live. '4 The perfect life does not con-
sist of looking upward while leaving the messy history of humans to its 
own miserable destiny. "This is the eternal life: that they know you, the 
only true God and the one you sent: Jesus Christ" Go 17,3). 
Continuing his interpretation of the cherubim in the sancta sanctorum, 
Bonaventure points out that their faces (i.e., the faces or aspects of wisdom, 
as mentioned in Hex. 2) not only are turned to one another, but are also 
looking at the propitiatorium, the place of reconciliation, or the "mercy-seat" 
on the ark (6, 4). The wonder of all wonders is not the mystery of God's tri-
une essence and internal love, but the "superadmirable" realization of 
God's human, i.e., corporeal and mortal reality in Jesus Christ. Here we 
rejoin the beginning of Bonaventure's Conferences on the Hcxaemeron: as 
the central sacrament, Christ is the beginning and the end, Alpha and 
Omega, of contemplation. Perfect spirituality is the fully unfolded experi-
ence of its beginning in faith (6, 5). 
Bonaventure addresses himself (in Itin. 6, 5) to the reader whom he has 
identified as the synthesis of the two cherubs: focusing on the "essentials" 
of God (cap. 5), you are admiring the paradoxes of God's being first and 
last, eternal and totally present, simple and greatest, perfectly one and 
encompassing all modes of being. Yet, do not forget that to be a good 
cherub, you must concentrate on the drama in which the reconciliation 
between God and humans is realized. The ultimate secret is not found in 
the unique, perfect, immense and eternal Present of the unique Divinity; it 
is hidden in the corporeal, humble and suffering history of that Presence. In 
the figure of the other cherub you are full of admiration for the mystery of 
God's trinity, but look at Christ's person, who makes this Trinity concrete in 
a human destiny (6, 6). Perfect enlightenment shows how the intention of 
the Creator and the internal life of God's self-communication are realized in 
the perfect image of God: a man who translates God's love in the elements 
of human history. The union of Creator and creation, known by faith, is 
experienced at the highest level of knowledge in an "experimental cogni-
tion," which, by surpassing comprehension, provokes admiration. 
Having shown how intellectual perspicacity reaches its limits and turns 
into an affective response, Bonaventure finally dwells on the peace that 
crowns the journey to God. This peace is not the peace of heaven, but rather 
participation in a final passage or transition (transitus) to God in company 
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with Christ (]tin. 7, 1). Once the stages of intellectual speculation have puri-
fied the mind, it is able to fully concentrate on the reconciliatory "sacrament 
that was hidden for ages" (a saeculis abscollditum, Eph. 3, 9): the man, who is 
God, hanging on a cross. There the secret of God is spread out in all the 
dimensions of space and time, thus showing "the breadth and the length and 
the height and the depth" of a love "that surpasses knowledge."'s The only 
appropriate way of responding to the self-manifestation of God in the midst 
of human history is an affective one that encompasses all the moments of 
mind and intellect and heart. Bonaventure enumerates the following 
moments of this final conversion: trust, hope, love, devotion, admiration, 
exultation, appreciation, praise and jubilation (Itin. 7,2). Instead of maintain-
ing a speculative distance, these affections unify the soul with the paseha of 
Christ who leads from Egypt through the Red Sea and the desert to paradise. 
At this point (Itin. 7, 2), it becomes clear how Bonaventure interprets the 
inherent negativity and the profound darkness (ealigo) indicated by 
Dionysius' Mystical Theology, and quoted toward the end of the Itinerary (]tin. 
7, 5). Reaching out to God leads through a desert of suffering with Christ 
into the peace of his grave. The certainty given by the Word of God that the 
very event of such a paseha is the presence (hodie) of paradise (Lue. 23,43), is 
not only an article of faith, but a felt experience (senticns tantum, !tin. 7, 2). 
The union with God in the dark cloud of ignorance, as thematized by 
Dionysius' Mystical Theology, is retrieved in a hermeneutics of an affective 
response to the sacrament of God's historical Passion. The ascent from affir-
mative names to negations and from negations to the obscure clarity of 
union is transformed into the passage from a theology of being and generosi-
ty to the dark splendor of a "more than" divine, namely, divinely human 
and historical, humiliated and mortified love. Sharing Christ's destiny in 
faith and love transforms a human being in God (]tin. 7, 4). 
The best preparation for this summit, which is at the same time the 
deepest depth, lies in the desire that motivates all the stages of the journey, 
but even this is a gift of the Spirit with whom Christ inspired human histo-
ry. The "natural desire" that rules all human ways is finally revealed to be 
the fire through which God's own spirit inflames the human heart. To 
understand this pertains to "the mystical wisdom" that is sought from the 
beginning. Darkness and peace, suffering and enjoyment, death and resur-
rection coincide in the human history of God's hidden presence. The rose 
in the cross is found neither in a dialectical explanation of the universe in 
light of a logical or superlogical Absolute, nor in an endless series of nega-
tions and supernegations; it reveals itself in an affectionate excess beyond 
all theoretical wrestlings with yes and no. "The Son of God, Jesus Christ [. . 
. J was not Yes and No; in Him it is always Yes. For all the promises of God 
find their Yes in Him. That is why we utter the Amen through Him, to the 
glory of God" (2 Cor 1, 19-20). According to Bonaventure, this Yes and 
Amen is not a logical one; it is a passionate loyalty to God as present in 
human history and to human history as revelation of God, a loyalty that 
knows how to endure the darkness of its mortality. 
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NOTES 
1. Oil Mystical Theology 1, 1-3; 3-5; On the Divine Names 1, 1.5-7. 
2. On Mystical Theology 1, 3; 5. 
3. Saint Bonaventure: Etudes sur les sources de sa pensce, Northampton, 
Variorum Reprints 1989 , Avant-propos. 
4. Cognitio et Amor. Zum kognitiven und voluntativen Grund der 
Gottescrfahrung nach Bonaventura, Paderborn, Schc)ningh 1990, pp. 123-124 and 
128-30; Jacques Guy Bougerol, Introduction a l' etude de Saint Bonaventure, 
Tournai, Desclee 1961, pp. 79-82; Saint Bonaventure: Etudes . .. , pp. 113-123. See 
also Zachary Hayes, introduction to the Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the 
Trinity, St. Bonaventure, NY, 1979, pp. 22-25. 
5. Saint Bonaventure: Etudes . .. , pp. 33-123 and 131-167. 
6. Franziskanische Studien 68 (1968), pp. 3-140. 
7. Hex 2, 32 has here: "dear Timotheus" (amice Timothee) and 2, 29 reads: 
"0 Timotheus, my friend" (0 Timothee amice). For the different translations of 
Pseudo-Dionysius into Latin and those used by Bonaventure, see Jacques Guy 
Bougerol, Saint Bonaventure: Etudes . .. , pp. 39-40 and 59-64. 
8. Corroborato itinere. Hex 2, 29 has: forti actione et contritione (with strong 
action and contrition), while Hex 2, 32 reads: forti contritione et actione. 
9. Ttinerarium 5,6; d. 1 Cor 15, 28. 
10. Cf. Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa I; Dionysius, On the Divine Names 3, 1 
and 4, 1. 
11. According to Bougerol, Saint Bonaventure: Etudes . .. , pp. 81-104, this dic-
tum is quoted 26 times in Bonaventure's work. The connection between God's 
goodness and the Trinity seems to be hinted at in On the Divine Names 2, 11, 
where the diakrisis theia (the divine difference) is explained as "the forthcoming 
emanations that fit the goodness of God's originariness" (hai agathoprepeis t_s 
thearchias proodoi). 
12. Cf. Proslogion cap. 5: "Tu [Deus] es itaque [ ... ] quidquid melius est esse 
quam non esse," and the title of this chapter: "Quod Deus sit quidquid melius 
est esse quam non esse." 
13. Cf. Marianne Schlosser, Lux inaccessibilis, pp. 18-27 on the certainty of 
our knowledge of God, who remains incomprehensible. The human intellect is 
able to know the entirety of God, but not in a comprehensive way (totus, non 
totaliter). See I Sent, dist 3, pars 1, qu 1; II Sent, dist 3, pars 2, art 2, qu 2; 1Il Sent, 
dist 14, a 1, qu 2-3. 
14. In Republic 519C-520A and 539E-540A Plato insists on the unity of the 
ascent (anabainein) and the descent (katabainein), but the latter is hardly empha-
sized by Plotinus and Dionysius. 
15. Eph. 3, 18-19. Bonaventure quotes Eph. 3, 14-19 many times at crucial 
places of his work; for example, at the beginning of his prologue to the 
Breviloquium, where it summarizes the program of his entire theology. See also 
the Com71l. in Sent, prooemium; Quest. Disp. de Scientia Christi VlIl; Itin 4,8; Hex 
8,4; Soliloquia, prologue. The Indices to the critical edition give 16 places. 
